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The Regulatory Reform Recommendations
of the National Performance Review*
Jeffrey S. Lubbers**
Introduction
I have been asked to summarize recommendations of Vice
President Gore's National Performance Review (NPR) - specifically
regarding regulatory reform. As an "alumnus" of that effort, I am
pleased to do so, but first let me introduce my "home" agency, the
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS).
ACUS was established as a permanent independent agency by the
Administrative Conference Act of 1964,1 following two successful
temporary administrative conferences in the Eisenhower and Kennedy
Administrations. Its mission is to be the federal government's in-house
expert and advisory agency on the administrative process. Its
organization is designed to tap the expertise of government "members"
from every significant agency in the executive branch and outside
experts. Conference procedures are designed to produce consensus on
the knotty procedural problems of the day.
ACUS has made nearly 200 recommendations to agencies, the
President, Congress and the Judicial Conference on subjects ranging
from government-wide issues such as administrative rulemaking,
adjudication, judicial review, enforcement, risk communication, and
open government procedures, to program-specific reforms pertaining to

occupational safety, taxes, environment and social security. 2 Many
*
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Better Regulations: The National Performance Review's Regulatory Reform
Recommendations, 43 Duke LJ. 1165 (1994) (a more heavily documented version
of this paper ).
** Mr. Lubbers is Research Director, Administrative Conference of the
United
States. He received his J.D. from the University of Chicago and his B.A. from Cornell
University. He served as team leader of the National Performance Review's Improving

Regulatory Systems team.
1

Pub. L. No. 88-499, now codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 591-596.
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have proved influential, leading to legislative and administrative
reforms that have improved government efficiency and fairness.
Although its Chairman is appointed by the President, the agency has
always operated in a nonpartisan, objective fashion - attempting to
serve all three branches to produce better government.
I was pleased to participate in NPR's large-scale, serious, scrutiny of
federal operations. Although several previous administrations had
undertaken similar studies, the NPR was different in that it relied
primarily on career government civil servants to perform the scrutiny.
About 200 employees from all over the federal government were
assembled, on loan from their home agencies, to work from March 3,
1993 to September 7, 1993 when the report was issued. They were
organized into a series of agency-specific and governmental systems
teams. Also, the President asked his cabinet to create internal
"reinvention teams" to work in parallel and create "reinvention
laboratories" to begin experimenting with new ways of doing business.
Finally, the Vice President personally held "town meetings" at each
cabinet department, heard from tens of thousands of citizens and led
reinventing government conferences in Tennessee and Philadelphia.
The report was published on time and became a best seller at the
Governmental Printing Office, 3 on the Internet and in two private
paperbacks. It describes about 100 of the most significant actions and
recommendations of the task force and lists hundreds more in
appendices. Most NPR members returned home after the report's
publication, but a residual staff of about 50 continues under NPR aegis
4
to seek implementation of the recommendations.
2 A list of Conference recommendations can be found at 1 C.F.R. § 305. Copies
are available from the Conference: (202) 254-7020.
3 From Red Tape to Results - Creating a Government That Works Better &
Costs Less (NPR Report). For information on how to order it, contact the National
Performance Review offices at (202) 632-0150.
4 Through a Memorandum for heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
Vice President Gore, on Jan. 3, 1995, launched the Second Phase 2 of the NPR to:
examine the basic missions of government, looking at every single government
program and agency to find and eliminate things that don't need to be done by the
ederal government. ... Phase 2 will also review the federal regulatory process to... get
better results for the public with less interference in their lives.
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The Improving Regulatory Systems Team
One of the eleven "systems reinvention teams" was the "Improving
Regulatory Systems" team. When I was recruited as leader in April, I
noticed that its name was a bit more modest than some of the other
teams that sported ambitious gerunds such as "transforming,"
"reinventing," rethinking," "redesigning" and "reengineering."
Whether intended or not, this turned out to be consistent with one of
our basic conclusions: Relieving the burden of regulatory process on
both the regulated and the regulators lies in improving the current
system rather than in radically restructuringit.
The only limit on the "reg-systems" (shortened to avoid becoming
the "IRS") team was not to duplicate the efforts of a White House task
force concurrently developing a new executive order on centralized
review of agency regulations for the Administration. 5 Our team
concentrated on the process within agencies, while the task force
focused on Presidential (OMB) review.
In interviewing regulators and regulated parties, we invariably found
that the first item on their agenda was "OMB review of rules."
Fortunately, our limitation precluded discussions of this politicallycharged issue and enabled us to develop consensus recommendations
more easily. Yet, it became clear that our team and the task force
needed to know what each other was doing,, so I was invited to task
CC

force meetings. As a result, the NPR report contained an oudine of the
pending Executive Order, and, when issued on September 30, the
6
Order included some of our team's ideas.
Scheduling demands necessitated by our deadline made empirical
research impossible. We therefore reviewed past studies (including, of
course, those done by ACUS) and conducted a series of interviews with
business groups, public interest lawyers, and agency and Congressional
staffs about perceived regulatory problems to begin making (and
auditioning) lists of problems and potential solutions.
5 See, e.g., Linda Jo Schierow, Senator Johnston's Proposals for Regulatory
Reform..., 6 Risk 1 (1995) (Johnston's proposals for EPA are compared and
contrasted with Reagan, Bush and Clinton Executive Orders).
6 E.O. 12,866, 58 F.R. 51735 (1993).
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In June we received a major boost with the release of a three-year
study by a panel of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology
and Government, headed by former EPA Administrator Douglas
Costle. 7 The panel was exceptionally distinguished and included,
Judges Stephen Breyer and Patricia Wald, Professors Donald Elliott
and Richard Merrill, and former duPont Chairman, Irving Shapiro,
among others. Its report was quite thoughtful and consistent with our
findings, and we drew heavily from it.
So where did we come out? Overall we concluded that many
complaints about the substance of regulations were exacerbated by
problems with the regulatory process. Regardless of general views about
regulation or deregulation, most interviewees agreed that:
* Regulation is too often uncoordinated and duplicative
* Regulators and Congress should be more selective and
sophisticated in the choice of regulatory approaches
* Better and earlier opportunities to participate in the
rulemaking process would be valuable
* Agency clearance procedures should be streamlined for
less significant rules
• Negotiated rulemaking, although not a panacea, is a
technique worth promoting
* Risk prioritization imposes needed discipline on
regulatory agencies
* Agencies need to find better ways to import good
science into regulatory decisionmaking
* Agency heads and regulators need more training in the
process and substance of regulation
* Agency regulators and congressional personnel need to
talk to each other more frequently and effectively
That consensus led us to believe that we could recommend reforms
that, neither pro- nor anti-regulation, would produce better regulations.
Also, it reinforced our belief that the foundation prescribed by the
Administrative Procedure Act is basically sound and that a radical
restructuring of the process is unnecessary.

7

Carnegie Comm'n on Science, Tech. & Gov't, Risk and the Environment:

Improving Regulatory Decision Making, (1993).
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The Recommendations
Our review resulted in ten recommendations approved by the Vice
President for the NPR report. 8 I will discuss each, noting any action
already taken to implement them.
Createan InteragencyRegulatory CoordinatingGroup
This recommendation, 9 in a sense, sets the stage for the others. In
urging creation of a forum for agencies to discuss overlapping policy
issues and cross-cutting process issues, we hearkened back to President
Carter's U.S. Regulatory Council, headed by Douglas Costle, that
improved coordination in several areas and showed much promise
before it was disbanded after the 1980 election.
We concluded, that the need for coordination, if anything, had
increased in the intervening years. We were pleased that President
Clinton agreed and in E.O. 12,866 directed the establishment of an
interagency Regulatory Working Group (RWG) chaired by the OIRA
Administrator. The RWG has already had numerous meetings and has
created task forces on risk assessment, use of cost-benefit analysis,
streamlining agency rulemaking and using information technology in
regulation. This should help implement other recommendations.
EncourageMore InnovativeApproaches to Regulation
As our report emphasizes, one of the biggest challenges regulators
face is choosing the best tool to solve a problem. 1 0 In many instances,
a nonregulatory solution may be best. Examples include efforts to spur
technological innovation (e.g., EPA's "Golden Carrot" program to
encourage development of an environmentally friendly refrigerator),
information disclosure and consumer education. Where action is
needed, market-oriented approaches are sometimes preferable. We
urged high-level encouragement for agencies to consider this. Again,
President Clinton's E.O. 12,866 directs agencies to do so.
8 See NPR Report, Appendix C, at 167-68. The team's report was issued shortly
thereafter, see Office of the Vice President, Accompanying Report of the National
Performance Review: Improving Regulatory Systems (1993) (hereafter Regulatory
Systems Report). To obtain this report see supra note 3.
9 Id, at 17-22.
10 Id at 23-28.
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To help make this a reality, we also urged development of a
Deskbook on Regulatory Design for regulators and legislators to have
at their fingertips. It would describe alternative regulatory approaches,
analyze their strengths and weaknesses, and suggest when to use them
and how to combine them. The RWG could sponsor and oversee the
development of the Deskbook.
EncourageConsensus-BasedRulemaking
As students of risk regulation know, traditional notice-andcomment rulemaking has too often tended to discourage cooperation
by persons who might be adversely affected. 1 1 This often leads to
protracted litigation, especially in controversial areas such as
environmental or workplace safety rules.
To counter this, the ACUS developed an approach called
negotiated rulemaking (sometimes called regulatory negotiation or
"reg-neg").12 It relies on a convener who holds open sessions with
representatives of affected interests and of the agency to produce a
consensus-based proposal. It still undergoes the usual comment process,
but areas of controversy should be limited, comments few and lawsuits
rare. Since 1982, there have been about 35 reg-negs undertaken by
about a dozen agencies and most have produced consensus or nearconsensus, dramatically reducing litigation.
The report details the benefits and limitations of this approach and
urges the President to encourage its use. Again, the President generally
advocated reg-neg in E.O. 12,866 and has directed agencies to select at
least one pending or proposed rulemaking as a candidate for reg-neg or
explain why it is not feasible. 13 Already OIRA and ACUS have held a
well-attended symposium to help agencies follow the directive.
Enhance PublicAwareness andParticipation
One refrain that we heard repeatedly was that agencies need to do
more to secure early public awareness of rulemaking and not simply
rely on the Federal Register.1 4 Negotiated rulemaking is one way to
I Id at 29-33.
12 ACUS Recommendations 82-4, 85-5, 1 C.F.Rt § 305.82-4, 85-5 (1993).
13 Negotiated Rulemaking, Memorandum for Executive Departments and Selected
Agencies [and the] Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, 58 F.R. 52391 (1993).
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do so, but agencies have also used less formal mechanisms such as
policy discussion groups, public meetings, and focus groups to obtain
input on advance notices of proposed rulemakings, or on how existing
rules are working. Agencies should also consider whether an
ombudsman, as used by agencies like the Food and Drug
Administration, or a toll-free hotline might improve public
participation during the implementation of rules.
This area is one in which the use of new information technologies
has great potential for improving public interaction with agencies. The
computerization of rulemaking dockets, electronic bulletin boards, even
e-mail reg-negs, are ideas that soon may be realized.

StreamlineRulemaking Procedures
We found that many agencies had great difficulty even describing
their internal clearance process. 1 5 One hired a contractor to produce
an 18-foot flow chart with 373 boxes to describe its rulemaking process.
We encouraged the RWG to help agencies develop ways to "tier"
their internal review process so that less controversial rules face fewer
procedural hurdles. This selective approach mirrors that taken by E.O.
12,866 for OIRA's review of agency rules.
We also discovered a new idea - new, at least, outside the EPA
"direct final" rulemaking. Under this procedure that EPA uses to issue
rules it expects to be noncontroversial, a notice in the Federal Register
states that the rule will become effective in 60 days unless someone
submits notice within 30 days of intent to object. EPA officials told us
they had correctly predicted about 90% of the time and had cut
internal review by more than half for such rules. Recently large agencies
in the Departments of Agriculture and Transportation announced plans
to use this procedure. 1 6 More generally, President Clinton by directive
has required agencies to examine internal rulemaking clearance process
17
and report in six months on steps taken.
14 Regulatory Systems Report, supra note 7 at 35-40.
15 .Tdat 41-46.
16 See, e.g., Agricultural Marketing Service, Policy Statement on Use of Direct
Final Rulemaking, 59 F.R. 51083 (1994); Federal Aviation Administration, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking on Direct Final Rulemaking Procedure, 50 F.R. 50676 (1994).
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EncourageADR when EnforcingRegulations
We hope the term "alternative" dispute resolution (ADR) will soon
be a misnomer as, e.g., mediation, arbitration, minitrial or early neutral
evaluation become part of agencies' everyday menu for resolving
disputes, along with adjudication. 1 8 Yet, the acronym "ADR" may be
saved by substituting "appropriate" for "alternative."
Certainly the movement toward ADR by federal agencies
accelerated with passage of the 1990 Administrative Dispute Resolution
Act 1 9 that removed some hurdles. Unfortunately, despite clear success
in, e.g., the EPA and the Departments of Health & Human Services
and Labor, some agencies have given ADR a limited reception. We
asked the President to give it a high-level push - especially in the area
of budgetary and personnel incentives - and to make it easier to hire
neutrals.
We were especially pleased that the NPR Report specifically
supported expanded use of ADR and its rulemaking cousin, regneg. 2 0 The Administrative Conference is continuing to actively
promote these recommendations. Also, NPR selected ACUS to
develop a pilot project to use e-mail to connect agency ADR programs
and to place on-line an extensive library of resources concerning ADR.
Rank Risks andEngage in 'Anticipatory"RegulatoryPlanning
Improved long-range strategic planning was a theme of NPR,
leading in part to the Government Performance and Results Act of
199321 that authorizes agencies to create pilot projects on
performance-based strategic planning initiatives. Our specific
recommendation 2 2 grew out of the success of the EPA. That agency,
in 1987, asked 75 senior career managers to compare and rank the
relative risks posed by 31 agency-regulated problems. This pointed out
not only disparities between the rankings and the legislatively17 See Memorandum on Agency Rulemaking, 29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1933
(Sept. 30, 1993).
18 Regulatory Systems Report, supra note 7 at 47-52.
19 5 U.S.C. % 571-583 (Supp. IV 1992).
20 NPR report, supra note 3 at 118-19.
21 Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 290 (1993).
22 Regulatory Systems Report, supra note 7 at 53-57.
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mandated resource allocation at EPA, but also variance between public
and "expert" perceptions of risk. In 1990, EPA's Science Advisory
Board made further recommendations to the Administrator on how to
prioritize risks. We joined the Carnegie Commission in applauding this
as a "groundbreaking enterprise " 23 and urged the other 20 or so
agencies that regulate health, safety or environmental risks to follow.
Related to risk-prioritization is a need to anticipate future problems.
EPA is also a leader here. It has established a "futures staff' to
anticipate problems such as one it failed to anticipate - mercury in
discarded cool fluorescent lamps. Had this been anticipated, lamps
could have been made without mercury. The futures staff has already
identified a similar problem with lithium in electric cars. We suggested
that regulatory agencies be encouraged to develop processes and devote
resources for ranking risks and anticipating future regulatory problems.
Improve Regulatory Science
Most decisions are made by agency heads who are normally not
scientists, relying on advice of officials more likely to be lawyers than
scientists. 2 4 When such decisions are challenged in court, they are
reviewed by judges, who rarely have scientific training. This process is
understandably regarded as deficient among scientists.
Scientific advisory boards are a partial solution. EPA has a largescale, well-funded Science Advisory Board (SAB) that advises the
Administrator on scientific and technical aspects of environmental
problems. FDA has recently followed suit with a 12-member board.
We joined the Carnegie Commission to urge agencies to improve
their scientific capabilities. We urged regulatory agencies that depend
heavily on scientific information to create such a board or explain why
not. The President has taken this advice by creating a National Science
and Technology Council within the White House 2 5 as well as the
26
President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology
made up of his Science Advisor and fifteen outside scientists.
23 Carnegie Comm'n, supra note 6 at 81.
24 Regulatory System Report, supra note 7 at 59-63.
25 E.O. 12, 881, 58 F.R. 62491 (1993).
26 E.O. 12, 882, 58 F.R. 62493 (1993).
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ImproveAgency and CongressionalRelationships
Most of what federal agencies do is traceable to their legislative
mandates, and it is not unusual for regulators to complain that their
hands are tied by overly restrictive, excessively detailed, poorly
27
conceived, or inexpertly drafted legislation.
Wherever blame may lie, communication between agencies and
congressional counterparts has broken down. The problem has perhaps
been exacerbated by divided political control in recent years. Congress
has not trusted agencies, and agencies, for their part, have not been
completely forthcoming in the drafting process.
More frequent interbranch forums was an approach our team
favored. Specifically, we discovered that it was the exception for
agencies to provide drafting assistance to legislative staffs. We
recommended that a process be developed by which a designated
senior agency official could advise chairpersons and ranking members
of Congressional committees as long as appropriate disclaimers
concerning the Administration's position (or lack thereof) on pending
legislation were respected.
ProvideBetter TrainingandIncentivesfor Regulators
We began discussion of our final recommendation with the truism
that "a regulatory system is only as good as the people implementing
it. ' ' 2 8 Recommendations for improved training are hardly exciting,
but we were genuinely struck by the glaring lack of training for
presidential appointees - especially given the intensive orientation that
members of Congress and the federal judiciary receive. A recent study
by the National Academy of Public Administration found that 79% of
presidential appointees reported that they received no orientation
whatsoever. 29 We are encouraged that the RWG has acknowledged
this problem and is exploring ways to address it with the
Administrative Conference.
27 Regulatory Systems Report, supra note 7 at 65-68.
28 Id at 69-73.
29 Id.at 70 (citing Robert S. Adler et al., Shaping Up Federal Agencies: A Basic
Training Program for Regulators, 6 J.L. & Pol. 343, 364, n.90 (1990), quoting
National Academy of Public Administration, Leadership in Jeopardy. The Fraying of
the Presidential Appointments System 20 (1985)).
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At lower levels, there is a good ongoing training program for federal
lawyers, the Legal Education Institute in the Department of Justice.
Unfortunately, several years ago legislation required the program to
move to South Carolina where it is unlikely to attract as many students
or pro bono faculty.
Finally, we were inspired by Justice Breyer's suggestion that
regulatory professionals be cultivated within the government and
encouraged to rotate among the branches as in the French Conseil
d'Etat. 3 0 Our slightly less grand plan would establish at least an
"honors" rotation for select mid-level career staffers among agencies
with key regulatory mandates. OIRA Administrator Katzen has
31
announced plans to begin such a program.
Conclusion
We are pleased that some of our recommendations are already
coming to fruition. Other teams also proposed regulatory changes.
Some, e.g., a suggestion for more reg-neg at the Department of Labor
were consistent with ours. 32 Others, e.g., allowing judicial review of
agency actions under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 33 expanded use
of waivers, 3 4 or shifting to self-inspection of worksites under
OSHA3 5 may need further refinement - in our opinion at least.
Critics may claim that we set our sights too low, ignoring proposals
such as a regulatory budget, "sunset" laws, specialized administrative
courts or new kinds of impact statements. Yet, we were convinced of
the low costs and risks of our recommendations and did not think that
more radical approaches were either necessary or feasible.

30 Id at 71, (citing Stephen G. Breyer, The Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Rick
Regulation (1993)).
31 Letter from Sally Katzen to author (and other members of RWG) describing
"OIRA's Regulatory Exchange Program" and soliciting participation (Jan. 11, 1994).
32 NPR Report, supra note 3, App. A at 146 (Recommendations DOL03 and

DOL04).
33 Id App. A at 148 (Recommendation SBA01).
34 Id App. C at 160 ( Recommendation SMC08).
35 Id App. A at 146 (Recommendation DOLl0).
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